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Abstract  
This paper examines the interplay between innovation and entrepreneurial processes amongst 
competing firms in the creative industries.  It does so through a case study of the introduction 
and diffusion into Britain of a brass musical instrument, the wide bore German horn, over a 
period of some 40 years in the middle of the twentieth century. The narrative contrasts the 
strategies followed by two brass instrument manufacturers, one a new entrant the other an 
incumbent. It shows how the new entrant despite a slow start, small scale and a commitment 
to traditional artisanal skills, was able to develop the technology of the German horn and 
establish itself as one of the world’s leading brands of horn, while the incumbent firm despite 
being the first to innovate steadily lost ground until like many of the other leading horn 
makers of the 1930s, it eventually exited the industry. 
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Introduction 
For much of the 19th and a substantial part of the 20th century, British orchestras had a 
distinctive sound. This differentiated them from their counterparts in many parts of Europe 
and the United States. This sound was the product of the instruments they played, most 
notably in the horn section of the orchestra. In Britain horn players typically utilized 
instruments modelled on the Raoux horn from France. This French horn had a narrow bore, a 
small bell and piston-operated valves.  Although more difficult to play and prone to cracked 
notes, for a hundred years this was the instrument that dominated horn playing in Britain.  
 
However in the interwar years concert-goers in Britain started to experience a different 
sound. This emanated from foreign orchestras. They generally used the German horn rather 
than its French counterpart. This instrument used rotary valves instead of piston valves, had a 
wider bore and a larger flared bell. These features gave the instrument a deeper, richer and 
louder sound. Although the leading British horn players of the time continued to adhere to the 
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French version of the instrument, in the mid-1930s one British brass instrument manufacturer 
boldly stepped forward to produce a German horn.  
 
This innovation ultimately proved to be an example of what Christensen1 terms a ‘disruptive 
technology’, a concept that has echoes of earlier innovation studies, notably Schumpeter’s 
concept of ‘creative destruction’2. Disruptive technologies are new technologies that initially 
underperform with regard to the performance dimensions most valued by mainstream 
customers of existing products3. However as Schmidt and Druehl4 point out these 
technologies may perform better on other dimensions, especially ones valued by new or 
fringe customers5. These potential customers offer the prospect of new market openings, 
typically in the form of niche markets6.  Subsequent development of disruptive technologies 
may however result in them being more widely applicable. In time their performance may 
even come to surpass the seemingly superior established technologies7. Thus a disruptive 
technology may eventually come to appeal to the very mainstream customers that initially 
shunned it. The result is likely to be market disruption, caused by the entry of new firms and 
the failure of incumbent firms to recognize the threat posed by the new technology8, leading 
to their downfall, and ultimately the exit of some or all of them from the market9.  
 
The prediction of market disruption brought on by the introduction of a disruptive technology 
was played out among the brass instrument manufacturers in Britain from the late 1930s 
onwards. As a new entrant appeared and developed the new technology, so the incumbent 
horn makers, despite one of them being the firm that pioneered the manufacture of German 
horns, were eventually overthrown and exited the industry. The new entrant went on to 
become one of the world’s leading horn makers.  
 
This paper examines the range of different forces, creative, economic, technological and 
institutional, that were at work and that ultimately brought about a significant market 
disruption in brass musical instrument manufacturing. It focuses especially on the interplay 
between innovations in brass instruments and entrepreneurial activity in new entrant and 
incumbent firms. The means to do this comes from a case study of innovations surrounding 
the introduction of the wide bore German horn into Britain in the middle years of the 
twentieth century. The case contrasts how the incumbent firms focused on their existing 
customers, especially brass bands and school orchestras, and introduced mass production 
methods in order to meet their needs, a strategy that led to their eventual exit from the 
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industry, while a new entrant focused on a different segment of the market, namely 
professional horn players and by employing traditional artisanal skills, specializing in the 
manufacture of a single instrument and working closely with its customers, developed a 
string of innovative new models of horn, that enabled it in time to build a truly international 
customer base.  
 
The case draws on a combination of interviews with key informants, including former 
employees, professional musicians and curators of instrument collections, and a range of 
documentary sources including personal papers and company records drawn from business 
archives. The former included the personal papers housed in the Bate Collection at Oxford 
University of the late Reginald Morley-Pegge, a leading authority on the French horn, while 
the latter included the Boosey and Hawkes archive housed at the Horniman Museum in South 
London.  
 
The innovation of the wide bore German horn 
The interwar years 
Until the mid-twentieth century there were significant variations in the styles and sounds of 
concert orchestras in different countries10. This was especially true of the horn, where as one 
leading horn player noted, ‘up to the mid-twentieth century, horn styles were distinctive, and 
it was relatively easy to detect the nationality of a player’11. This stemmed primarily from 
differences in the instruments used. Horns with a comparatively narrow bore and Périnet 
piston valves were almost universal12from the mid-nineteenth century onwards in Britain. 
According to Cousins13 even in the 1930s, ‘every one played on the piston-valved French 
horn in F’. As well as employing piston valves the narrow-bore French horn utilized a smaller 
bell that gave the bright, clear14 sound that British brass players and audiences preferred15. In 
contrast the German horn, with a wide bore, rotary valves and a larger bell, produced ‘a 
coarse, thick, open sound’, causing one leading authority on the horn to note, ‘In lightness 
and brilliance they are inferior to the true French horn’16.  Consequently British orchestras 
differed in terms of sound from those in much of continental Europe and America17.  
The popularity of the French instrument meant that this was the type of instrument 
manufactured in Britain throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and much of the 
first half of the twentieth century.  Although the Raoux horn produced in France and used by 
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among others, Aubrey Brain18 the principal horn at the BBC Symphony Orchestra from 1928 
until 1945, was regarded among British horn players as a ‘most fabled instrument’19, narrow 
bore French horns with Périnet piston valves were manufactured by several British firms. 
During the nineteenth century French horns of this type, certainly orchestral ones used by 
professional musicians, were produced in small ‘one man’ workshops20 where the exercise of 
a high level of craftsmanship and skill resulted in the production of a small number of high 
quality instruments. Examples included Charles Pace of King Street, Westminster and J. 
Goodison of Soho. 
By the early years of the twentieth century French horns of this type were being produced by 
most of the larger brass instrument manufacturers (see table 1). Of these, the firm of Hawkes 
& Son was one of the best known for producing high quality instruments. Despite producing 
a variety of instruments, French horns were a speciality of Hawkes & Son enjoying a separate 
catalogue in which the company promoted its range of horns (see figure 1). A copy of this 
catalogue published in 1930 shows that they manufactured two principal models of horn both 
of which were of the narrow bore French type. The models were the ‘Professional horn’ (H1 
model) termed a ‘Raoux’ model and the combined ‘Military & Orchestral horn’ (H2 model). 
The former was described as ‘of light construction throughout’ and was intended for, ‘the 
finest and most delicate solo work’21. Hawkes & Son’s catalogue claimed the instrument was  
used by the majority of leading British players  of the period  including Francis Bradley and 
Thomas Busby (see figure 2). As well as Hawkes & Son other leading British horn 
manufacturers included Bessons, Booseys and Rudall, Carte & Co. During the 1930s all 
produced two models of horn, one for the orchestral market and another more robust model 
for the military market. The duality evidences the continuing importance of the military 
market22. Indeed Rudall Carte’s catalogue for 1931 stressed how it made horns for the Royal 
Military College of Music23. But for both the military and orchestral markets the instruments 
produced were piston valved French horns. As Morley-Pegge24 notes these British firms not 
only copied the Raoux model of French horn, ‘but proudly advertised the fact’ in their 
catalogues.  
As well as these larger concerns at least one smaller one had survived. This was the firm of 
W. Brown & Sons. Better known as a manufacturer of cornets25, nonetheless the firm 
enjoyed, ‘a good name for its French horns and supplied some of the most expert players’26. 
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These included Franz Paersch, first horn at the Hallé Orchestra and Thomas Busby at the 
London Symphony Orchestra. 
The focus on the production of the French version of the horn with piston valves rather than 
its German counterpart, reflected the prevailing view in Britain where, as Morley-Pegge27 
notes, ‘London players had not as yet yielded to the blandishments of the comparatively new 
German horns’. Leading horn players of the interwar period like Aubrey Brain, clung 
doggedly to the French narrow bore instrument. They were often able to exert much influence 
by virtue of the posts they held in particular orchestras and by virtue of teaching posts they 
held as well. Morley-Pegge notes that Aubrey Brain, ‘would have no truck with the German 
double horn and insisted that the BBC quartet should only use instruments of the French 
model’28.  He also taught several leading postwar players including his son, Dennis Brain, 
John Burden and the distinguished soloist Alan Civil Indeed some, ‘old fashioned players 
continued to use it well into the 1950s’29. 
However during the 1930s things gradually began to change. For the first time the dominance 
of the narrow bore piston valve French horn in Britain started to face a challenge, as what has 
been described as a ‘wind of change’30 arose, as some among the classical music community 
began to question the superiority of the French instrument. Instead they started to see the 
possibilities offered by the German wide bore horn equipped with rotary rather than piston 
valves. As Morley-Pegge31 notes, ‘musical tastes in Britain suddenly veered from the once so 
much admired French horn to the no less despised German instrument’.  
Three factors lay behind this change. First and foremost was the growth of international 
travel during the 1930s as concert orchestras increasingly began to tour internationally. This 
introduced British audiences to many of the great orchestras from abroad including those of 
Berlin, Budapest, Vienna, Prague and New York32. This not only exposed them to much 
higher standards of performance but in many cases to new and unfamiliar sounds. An 
example of this was the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra’s first performance in London at the 
Queen’s Hall in December 1927, which introduced an British audience to the ‘bigger and 
darker sound of German and American orchestras’33. This stemmed in part at least from their 
use of the German wide bore horn.  
A second factor was the increasing willingness of some conductors and musicians in Britain 
at this time to experiment and innovate. Such innovations extended to the introduction of new 
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instruments.  Thus Sir Thomas Beecham, conductor of the newly formed London 
Philharmonic Orchestra (LPO), insisted that the new orchestra’s horn section under Charles 
Gregory should be equipped with wide bore Alexander horns. He even went so far as to send 
Alan Hyde over to Mainz in Germany in order to acquire a set of Alexander horns,34 paying 
for the instruments himself. The orchestra’s first performance, on 7th October 1932, proved 
highly successful35, and was received with ‘dazzling notices in the newspapers the next 
day’36. Beecham’s pioneering move contrasted with the reaction of leading British horn 
players, such as Aubrey Brain, who remained adamant that not only he, but the entire horn 
section of the BBC Symphony Orchestra, the orchestra that according to Pettitt, ‘virtually 
monopolised London’s music’37 at this time, should retain the narrow-bore French 
instrument38. 
A third factor leading to increased interest in the German horn was the growing importance 
of recording sessions for professional musicians and orchestras from the early 1930s 
onwards39. The introduction of electrical amplification after 1925 both improved the the 
sound quality of gramophone records and simplified the recording process since microphones 
were able to capture sound from sources that ranged over a wide area40. This, together with a 
more positive attitude towards the gramophone on the part of musicians from the late 1920s41 
led to orchestras spending an increasing amount of time in the recording studio. A recording 
contract with EMI played an important in helping Sir Thomas Beecham establish the London 
Philharmonic Orchestra in 193242. However recordings were still direct on to a wax disc so 
there was no scope to go back of there was a flaw in the performance43. Asa result achieving 
a more or less flawless performance was very much at a premium in these sessions. This was 
where the German horn scored over its French counterpart. Described as, ‘less capricious 
than the French horn’44, there was usual less need for expensive and time consuming re-takes. 
Meanwhile older players continued to resist. Despite this Boosey and Hawkes, the product of 
a merger in 1930 between the two long established instrument manufacturers Boosey & Co 
and Hawkes & Son, broke with tradition in Britain when in February 1935 it produced its 
first German horn. Given the strength of commitment to the French instrument among 
professional horn players in Britain at this time, this was a bold and innovative step. Just as 
horn makers in Britain had copied the French Raoux horn, so Boosey and Hawkes appear to 
have based their new instrument on one made by Ed. Kruspe of Erfurt in Germany. The 
innovation process was undertaken with the help of professional musicians as a photo (see 
7 
 
figure 3) of the new instrument describes it as the property of the well-known horn player 
Alan Hyde. With rotary valves, a wide bore and a larger bell this was an important innovation 
for a country where hitherto only piston valved French horns had been manufactured. Boosey 
and Hawkes decision to innovate in this way demonstrates the company’s awareness of the 
rising interest in German horns during the 1930s45. The development of an British made 
German horn was to prove a disruptive innovation in time leading to major changes among 
horn manufacturers. 
Despite opposition to this type of instrument from the older established horn players like 
Aubrey Brain, there proved to be a modest demand for this type of instrument. A total of 38 
German horns were produced by Boosey and Hawkes in the five years from 1935. This 
compares with more than 200 Raoux type horns (see table 4). However the outbreak of war in 
1939 quickly brought production to an end. Boosey and Hawkes switched to war production, 
manufacturing aircraft parts and munitions. Brass instruments continued to be made but in 
small quantities. Figure 4 shows that facilities for instrument manufacturing at Boosey and 
Hawkes were cramped and congested during the war years. The few horns manufactured at 
this time were all piston valved French horns.  
 
The postwar landscape 
In the postwar years, horn manufacturing in Britain differed greatly from the 1930s when 
there had been four well established incumbent horn manufacturers. By the mid-1940s the 
four firms had been reduced to just one, Boosey & Co acquired all three of its main rivals, 
including Rudall Carte in 1941 and Besson & Co in 1948. In each case their manufacturing 
plant was closed and production re-located to the large modern plant built by Hawkes & Son 
at Deanbrook Road in Edgware. One other smaller firm, noted in the past for its high quality 
horns used by professional musicians, W. Brown & Sons, although still in business had given 
up horn manufacturing to focus on repair work. Brass instrument manufacturing at Boosey & 
Hawkes at its Edgware plant had however been severely disrupted for six years owing to war 
production. 
The ending of hostilities had brought a new source of competition for Britain’s remaining 
horn maker Boosey and Hawkes. This competition came from second hand German horns 
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made by leading German manufacturers like Alexanders of Mainz and Kruspe of Erfurt. In 
Germany’s war ravaged economy where basic necessities like food and fuel were in very 
short supply, individuals were often forced to sell their few remaining assets, which included 
musical instruments. As a result horns, in particular high quality Alexander horns, could be 
acquired according to one source, for little more than a packet of fags’46. They were also easy 
to import in this period - it was not unusual for musicians to travel to Germany with a case 
carrying a conventional French horn which was then exchanged for a high quality Alexander 
horn47. 
Demand for the German designs was also influenced by other post-war developments.  In  
1945,one of the main bastions of the French instrument,  Aubrey Brain, retired through ill-
health. Perhaps more importantly, this period saw the de-mobilization of many younger horn 
players, including Aubrey Brain’s son Dennis Brain, John Burden, Tony Tunstall and Ifor 
James48.  This younger generation were ready to forsake the French narrow-bore instrument 
and make the switch to the wide bore German horn, ‘thereby closing an era of British horn 
playing’49.  
1945 also saw the arrival of a new entrant among the now much depleted ranks of the 
incumbent British horn makers. During the inter-war years the London-based firm Paxman 
Bros, originally established in 1919 as  a specialist brass instrument dealer50, built up a 
successful repair operation specializing in horns and based in London’s musical heartland at 
Shaftesbury Avenue in Soho (see figure 3). Paxmans had proved themselves to be versatile in 
this period, and  undertook tuning and modification work as a complement to their repair 
work. This work was well-regarded by professional musicians.  For example,  in the 1930s, 
when Sir Thomas Beecham acquired a number of Wagner tubas from Alexanders for use at 
Covent Garden, it was to Paxmans that he turned to make them playable51. 
 
The incumbent horn maker 
Boosey and Hawkes resumed horn production at their plant in Edgware in 1945, but appear to 
have made relatively modest changes to their practices in this radically-changed landscape. 
As in the prewar period they produced both military and orchestral horns. For the military 
market they continued to produce the same piston valve French horn they had made 
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previously, a design inherited from Hawkes & Son when the firm was acquired in 1930. 
Although output of these horns was somewhat erratic with none at all being produced in 
some years, the overall trend was a slowly declining market. Overall production of 188 horns 
over the ten years 1945-54 was down on the 1930s level and well down on the 1920s level, 
and this was the amalgamated output for what had at one time been four independent firms.  
The trend for the orchestral sector of the market in contrast was modestly upward from 1945 
(see table 6). Initially Boosey and Hawkes only produced piston valve French horns and even 
these were made in comparatively small numbers. The lack of German horns in the 
immediate postwar years may have been a reflection on the availability of cheap second hand 
German horns at this time. However this changed in 1948 when Boosey and Hawkes resumed 
production of German horns. These were the same models as those produced before the war, 
though they were now referred to in the company’s brass instrument book as, ‘rotary horns’52. 
Production of German horns increased steadily. Somewhat surprisingly there appears to have 
been a continuing demand for the conventional piston valve French horn. As table 6 shows 
this continued to be produced in quantities not dissimilar from the 1930s, even as late as the 
mid-1950s. However these horns were now being built in larger batches of up to twelve at a 
time. German horns in contrast were still being made in small batches of two or four.  
What is particularly striking about Boosey and Hawkes’s production of horns is how, despite 
having acquired three additional firms of horn makers, overall production levels for horns 
remained fairly constant. Over the ten years from 1945-54 production of horns (both 
orchestral and military) averaged 53.4 per year. This was very similar to the levels of horn 
production in the 1920s and 1930s (see tables 2 and 3), prior to the consolidation of 
production at the instrument manufacturing plant in Edgware. This was despite big increases 
in production of other instruments. The Boosey and Hawkes instrument books show that the 
firm’s output of trumpets and trombones in particular rose sharply in the early 1950s, often 
with them being produced in much larger batches. Myers53notes that after 1955 Boosey and 
Hawks output of brass instruments overall increased very dramatically. Having averaged 
3,292 per year in 1945-54, instrument production increased to 22, 176 per year in 1950-59, a 
sevenfold increase. This growth in output from the Edgware plant was the result of an ever 
increasing range of instruments being made combined with a massive increase in volumes 
through a switch to mass production.   Batch sizes for the more popular instruments like 
cornets, trumpets and trombones rose to 100 or even 200.  Most operations now comprised 
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repetitive tasks carried out by semi-skilled employees rather than specialist craftsmen who 
had served a brasswind-making apprenticeship54.  This allowed the company to increase 
brasswind production dramatically. This reflected the company’s evolution into a volume 
producer focused on three principal market segments. These were the large brass band 
market, in which they enjoyed a near monopoly following the acquisition of Besson & Co in 
194855, together with the lucrative education market for school bands and orchestras56 and a 
growing export market57. In this way Boosey and Hawkes were following a trend set by the 
larger US manufacturers who produced brass instruments mainly for high school and 
marching bands.  
Orchestral horns in contrast represented only a tiny fraction of Boosey and Hawkes overall 
output of brass instruments at this time. Indeed horn production remained stuck in something 
of a backwater. Despite having pioneered the innovation of a German style rotary valve 
double horn in F and Bb before the war, the company does not appear to have developed this 
innovation any further. This same horn, referred to in the instrument books as the ‘Emperor’ 
model, remained in production throughout the 1950s and 1960s. It was specifically described 
as a ‘rotary horn’ and was available in two variants with either corded or lever action. Unlike 
other instruments these horns continued to be made in small batches of two or four, by the 
same two individuals, one of whom had made them in the pre-ware era. By the 1960s the 
firm had ceased to actually manufacture rotary valves, with valve clusters now bought in 
from Alexanders58 in Germany.  
The outsourcing of valve manufacture proved to be the start of a lengthy process by which 
Boosey and Hawkes curtailed some of its brass instrument manufacturing activities.  Faced 
with what has been described as a ‘mind boggling’ span of products in its product range, 
from the beginning of   the 1970s the company increasingly resorted to outsourcing not 
merely for component and parts but for the production of whole instruments59.  
When the elder of the two craftsmen specializing in horn production retired in 197060, this 
presented the company with a dilemma, since by this time horns formed a comparatively 
small niche in the company’s vast range of products. In the face of a demand for increased 
pay from the one remaining craftsman specializing in the manufacture of horns and reluctant 
to train up a new craftsman to work alongside him, Boosey and Hawkes decided to outsource 
not only the manufacture of valves but the production of complete instrument. Henceforth 
Boosey and Hawkes french horns were built by the Czech instrument maker, Josef Lidl of 
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Brno61. Lidl had been making rotary horns since the 1920s62 and now produced for Boosey 
and Hawkes what was essentially a copy of the classic Alexander 103 horn63 dating from 
about 1950. Described as the ‘Model 400’ it was sold as a Boosey and Hawkes french horn, 
though ‘Made by Josef Lidl’ was clearly inscribed on the bell. Despite being an Alexander 
design, this model lacked the cache of better known brands of orchestral horn64 and was 
rarely used by professional horn players. Sales continued at the same modest level of between 
30 and 50 per year65 and this horn remained in production for the next 30 years.  
Boosey and Hawkes’ decision to outsource the manufacture of their horns in 1970 effectively 
marked a key turning point in brass instrument manufacturing in Britain general and horn 
production in particular. The exit from the industry of the fourth and last of the incumbent 
horn makers at the time of the innovation of German rotary horn in Britain, meant that the 
market changes brought on by the coming of this disruptive innovation were now complete.  
The very last chapter closed in 2001 with the decision by Boosey and Hawkes to close the 
Edgware plant itself66, thereby bringing brass instrument manufacturing to an end. 
 
 The new entrant. 
While it was one of the incumbent horn makers that pioneered the production of the German 
horn in Britain, it was a new entrant to horn making that developed the innovation. The new 
entrant was the firm of Paxmans. Founded as Paxman Bros in 1919 by three brothers, Harry, 
William and Bertram67, the firm was originally an instrument dealer based at Southwark 
Street near London Bridge, supplying instruments to brass and military bands. In 1935 they 
moved to Shaftesbury Avenue68, from where they not only sold instruments but also 
undertook instrument repairs. Although they briefly produced sousaphones by converting 
second hand helicons69, they gradually began to specialize in horns becoming agents for the 
Paris-based french horn maker Courtois70. They also did a lot of repair work on french horns. 
The extent to which the firm had begun to specialise in french horns during the 1930s can be 
gauged from the 1936 edition of the Musicians Union handbook (see figure 5) which carries 
an advertisement for the firm in the section listing professional horn players.  
Having been bombed out during the war, Paxmans acquired spacious new premises at 
Gerrard Street in Gerrard Street in 194471. Here they were well placed to meet the needs of 
12 
 
professional musicians whose services were increasingly in demand in the 1940s. The 
following year Harry Paxman’s son Robert joined the firm. A plumber by training his metal-
working skills were to prove invaluable. As well selling brass instruments the firm continued 
to service and repair them and built up a reputation for adapting and modifying French horns 
to meet customers’ specific requirements72.   
 
However with many men and women still in the armed forces and changes arising from 
wartime production73, there was a shortage of skilled instrument makers. Faced with this 
Harry Paxman managed to ‘poach74’ three experienced brass instrument craftsmen, Harry 
Pace, Charles Staneford and Joe Dobson75, from Boosey & Hawkes and Besson & Co.  
With five craftsmen now working in the workshop76, Harry Paxman, the firm’s instrument 
specialist, was keen not merely to repair and modify French horns but to manufacture them as 
well, as the scale of the business now matched the workshop-based brass instrument makers 
that dominated the trade in the late 19th and early 20th centuries77. However it wasn’t 
conventional piston valve French horns that Paxman wanted to produce. From the outset, he 
was determined to innovate by producing the new wide bore German horn that was 
increasingly being used by horn players in Britain. Rather than design a German horn from 
scratch Paxman chose to base his horn on ones made by the leading German firm of 
Alexanders of Mainz.  
However innovation presented a number of quite specific technical challenges. The most 
notable was how to produce the pieces of the instrument that needed to be hand-crafted, like 
the bell and the valve cluster78. The bell required a high degree of craft skill in order to form 
it from a single sheet of brass79. It was a demanding and difficult task requiring, ‘skilled 
tailoring of the sheet-metal’ by the instrument maker80.  It involved the use of a special 
template in the form of a ‘mandrel’, which was spun on a lathe. This acted as a jig or former, 
around which the sheet metal would be hammered to give the bell its precise and distinctive 
flared shape81.  To acquire this vital piece of equipment Harry Paxman persuaded one of his 
neighbours who owned a small general engineering business, to ‘knock up a mandrel’82 of the 
required shape and size. This proved entirely satisfactory.  
The fabrication of the intricate valve clusters was more problematic. Paxman needed to find 
skilled craftsmen capable of precision machining for the distinctive rotary valves that were 
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used in horns of German design83.  In Germany the smaller horn makers whose scale of 
production was insufficient to justify the precision machining required could source their 
valves from third parties, but in Britain this was out of the question since there were no 
specialist valve manufacturers84. However if they were to be manufactured in-house this 
would potentially involve a significant investment in men and machines to perform the 
precision machining required. Again Harry Paxman came up with a novel solution to the 
problem of acquiring this capability. Making use of his personal network of contacts, he 
found two precision turners who were working for the local gas board. Neither had any prior 
experience of musical instruments. But they were employed to carry out precision machining 
of prototype gas fittings and their metalworking skills were transferable, since the tight 
tolerances needed to produce rotary valve clusters were very similar to those needed for gas 
fittings85. Thus in a classic piece of improvisatory bricolage, Harry Paxman persuaded both 
men to ‘moonlight’ for Paxmans on Saturdays, while continuing to be employed full-time for 
the gas board during the week.  
The company’s initial output was very limited and in the first year, total production amounted 
to just three horns86. These early horns were still relatively crude but they quickly improved 
and by 1948 annual production had just crept into double figures87. During the course of the 
1950s output gradually increased. At this time the company’s range of horns was 
comparatively limited. They were still basically copies of the German Alexander horn. A 
Paxman catalogue of from the mid-1950s describes the firm as, ‘specialist makers of Rotary 
Valve Horns’88. The catalogue gives details of three models of horn, all German rotary horns. 
They including a double horn in F/Bb and a five valve version.  Rotary valves were very 
much one of the firm’s specialisms at this time as a testimonial from Dennis Brain notes the 
firm’s ‘expert workmanship’ in fitting a rotary valve to one of his horns.   
By 1959 the firm’s annual output had reached 30 horns per year89, a level that exceeded 
Boosey’s output of orchestral horns in the 1920s (see table 2). Horn production was now in 
the hands of three craftsmen, each of whom specialised in a particular aspect of horn 
production.  Robert Paxman made bells while Fred Leach was ‘the valve man’90. Fred had 
perfected the machining and turning of rotary valves and now crafted very high quality valve 
blocks. The third person was Ted Adams, the horn builder. Unlike the others, he was himself 
a horn player, which meant that as well as being, ‘a really good craftsman’, he was someone 
who, ‘really cared about making beautiful horns’91. This small close-knit team of craftsmen, 
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each of whom contributed in a different way, was to form the cornerstone of Paxmans’ horn 
manufacturing capability over more than thirty years. 
The 1960s saw Paxman enter a new phase in their development. The previous year they had 
modified a horn for an Australian horn player resident in Britain. Richard Merewether (see 
figure 6) was a talented professional horn player with distinguished musical connections in 
the orchestral field. He had studied at the Sydney Conservatorium of Music, where his circle 
of friends included the conductor Charles Mackerras, the violinist, Patricia Tuckwell and her 
brother, Barry Tuckwell92, who was later to become a horn player of international renown. 
Merewether had followed Mackerras and Tuckwell to Britain in 1950. By the late 1950s he 
was working as a freelance horn player who, ‘made something of a specialisation of very, 
very high register parts’93. To facilitate this Merewether had persuaded Alexander’s of Mainz 
to build him a horn to his own design specifically for his own personal use. When in 1959 he 
wanted further modifications, rather than make the trip to Mainz, Merewether got Paxmans to 
carry out the work94. The following year he came back with a new design of double descant 
horn in F/F-Alto and having learnt that Paxmans possessed the capacity to manufacture rotary 
valves in-house, he asked them to build it. This particular instrument, built solely for 
Merewether’s own personal use proved extremely successful. So successful was it, that 
gradually the word ‘got around’95 amongst professional horn players about the playing 
capabilities of this Merewether design, Paxman-manufactured horn. At this time according to 
one leading horn player, ‘all descant horns that were made before Merewether came along 
did have flaws’96. Among other weaknesses, ‘they were difficult to play’ and ‘they were 
fairly out of tune’. 
 
Paxmans duly began to build Merewether’s design for a double descant horn in F/F-Alto horn 
and offer it for sale to professional musicians. This was followed by a similar instrument in 
Bb//F-Alto97. As a result the Paxman range of horns gradually began to expand. A catalogue98 
for the firm from mid-1960s shows the product range having expanded to include some 12 
models of horn, all German-style rotary horns. They include two full double horns in F/Bb, 
three compensating double horns in F/Bb,  five single horns and two dual bore F/F-Alto 
double horns. A feature of all the horns was the use of hollow rotors for the valves, a feature 
which the catalogue notes were, ‘used by the finest German makers before the War, but now 
abandoned by them’99. The catalogue describes the horns as, ‘Paxman RM horns’, reflecting 
the close collaboration between Paxman staff and designer Richard Merewether.  
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As the design partnership between Merewether and Paxman flourished, a succession of new 
models followed. In 1967 Paxmans introduced a full triple horn in F/Bb/F alto, comprising 
three full sections of tubing. In 1968 a Merewether design double horn in Bb-Alto/Bb 
soprano appeared, enabling the modern horn player to cope with Baroque horn parts. 
Larkin100 notes that a feature of this instrument was, ‘a new control valve in which the 
windway diverges close to the mouthpiece before converging in a chamber with a larger tube 
diameter at the point where the tubing begins to expand into the bell’.   
In 1971 Merewether was forced by ill health to retire from horn playing. This provided him 
with an opportunity to work for Paxmans full time. This gave added impetus to the 
Merewether/Paxman partnership with the decade of the 1970s regarded by many as its 
heyday. Paxmans continued to innovate by producing new horn models. A Paxman catalogue 
for 1975101 reveals the product range had expanded dramatically with no less than 36 
different models of horn now available. To their range  what were described as ‘virtuoso’ 
horns featuring single, full double and compensating double horns were now added a variety 
of ‘dual bore double descant horns’, ‘dual bore triple descant horns’ and ‘dual bore 
compensating triple descant horns’. With this extensive range of specially designed horns 
Paxmans were able to meet the varied needs of professional horn players. And the company 
was now producing more than 200 professional quality hand-built horns per year102. There 
was no longer sufficient space in the London workshop that formed part of the showroom. In 
1972 the showroom relocated to Gerrard Street in Covent Garden in the heart of the West 
End. This move prompted the search for additional workshop premises. Since both Fred 
Leach and Ted Adams lived in Kent103, they suggested moving the production side of the 
business out of the capital to somewhere where appropriate industrial premises were available 
and rents were lower. A small factory unit was acquired on an industrial estate at Marden, 
near Maidstone. With greater space additional staff could be taken on, bringing the total 
employed in the workshop producing horns to eight104. This growth presented new problems, 
in particular around sub-contracting of production activities. Robert Paxman was seen by 
colleagues as particularly astute in distinguishing, ‘which stuff you do in-house and which 
stuff you outsource so that your time is used effectively’105. In practice, a large proportion of 
the work was retained in-house. From a company perspective, retaining control of production 
enabled the company to build horns of the highest quality, and horns produced at this time are 
looked back on as being, ‘Really good quality, an almost totally British made horn ... [built 
by] people who were really proud of their work’106. 
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During the course of the 1970s the innovative features and quality of workmanship of  
Paxmans’ horns became more widely acknowledged by professional musicians:  
‘The word got about that Paxmans were making horns that were on  a par with the 
German instruments and various London orchestras including the London Symphony 
Orchestra and the Royal Philharmonic ... were seen and heard to be playing Paxman 
horns’107 
The company was now recognised as a manufacturer of ‘excellent instruments’108. Its 
international reputation was also growing rapidly. At the start of the 1970s, Paxman horns 
were virtually unknown in other major markets109, but under sales manager Willi Watson, 
Paxmans began to target not merely leading horn players in Britain but those from other 
countries. One of their early successes came in 1975 when the German horn virtuoso Herman 
Baumann acquired a Paxman triple horn (see figure 6). Other internationally recognized horn 
players followed. The triple horn proved a particular success in the United States, helping to 
establish the company’s reputation in North America for horns of the highest quality. Osmun 
Music, based in Amherst, Massachusetts first became agents for Paxman horns in 1978110. 
By the early 1980s, in Richard Merewether’s own account, the company had, ‘built it up and 
up until most countries in the world now have a lot of our horns played by their leading 
players’111. Sadly the Merewether-Paxman design partnership came to an abrupt end with the 
death of Richard Merewether in 1985. By that time their collaboration had produced some 50 
models, though this figure included many derivatives. However, this did not bring an end to 
innovation at Paxmans. One of the later developments, which Robert Paxman oversaw 
shortly before his own retirement in 1995, was the introduction of lightweight valves fitted 
with titanium rotors. By then, forty years of research and development had produced a range 
of instruments that put Paxman Bros at the forefront of the manufacture of French horns of 
the highest quality. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
When the wide bore German horn first appeared in Britain there were four incumbent brass 
instrument makers producing French horns. Of these the leading firm in the orchestral market 
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was Hawkes & Son. Certainly its horns were used by the leading professional horn players of 
the day like Francis Bradley. By the time the wide bore German horn with rotary valves had 
really begun to make an impact in the early 1950s, the four had already been reduced to one. 
Boosey and Hawkes replicated the same recipes it had learned in the pre-war market, namely 
focusing on the big market segments like brass bands and school orchestras and an emphasis 
on cost reduction through the implementation of mass production. As a result they failed to 
build on their pioneering innovation of 1935. The same German horn first introduced in the 
1930s continued in production in the 1950s and 1960s. Boosey and Hawkes failed to develop 
and extend their capabilities in design and manufacturing. Instead they outsourced the key 
technology of rotary valve manufacture in the 1960s. This led ultimately to outsourcing the 
production of the complete instrument in the early 1970s. The result was a lack of new 
models and a lack of innovation. This meant they failed to meet the needs of what had at one 
time been a modest market niche but one that grew substantially in the postwar era.  
This was a classic example of Christensen’s112 disruptive innovation, where the introduction 
of a new technology leads to market disruption and the exit of some or all of the incumbent 
firms, largely because they continue to focus on the needs of their existing customers, 
ignoring customers on the fringe. In this case the existing customers were brass bands and 
school orchestras while the fringe customers were professional musicians playing in classical 
orchestras. It was left to a new entrant to meet the needs of this latter group through 
innovations that produced a new horns of the highest quality that were better able to meet 
their needs. 
Just how the new entrant provides some valuable lessons in business development. Unlike the 
incumbents they specialized in a single instrument. Over a number of years they developed a 
range of craft skills, particularly in the field of valve machining and bell making that gave 
them valuable capabilities and a competitive advantage in producing high quality 
instruments. Perhaps most important of all however was their ability to combine horn design 
and manufacturing skills. This was an almost unique combination that enabled the firm to 
produce a steady succession of innovations that not only met the needs of an expanding 
community of professional horn players, but gave the firm an international reputation in the 
process thereby creating an internationally recognized brand113.  
Perhaps surprisingly this is not an unusual pattern for the creative industries. During the 
course of the last 40 years a number of new entrants have emerged in musical instrument 
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manufacturing. A number of these are in the brass instrument field. They include several 
firms established by former employees of existing instrument makers. Notable examples in 
Britain are Rath Trombones and Smith-Watkins Trumpets. In both cases these are firms that 
specialize in a single instrument, producing very high quality markets aimed at professional 
musicians. Nor is this a purely British phenomenon. In Italy Paolo Fazioli set out in 1980 to 
design a piano that would sound superior to any other piano114. Like Paxmans, Fazioli relies 
on craft skills and design expertise. Producing only 140 instruments a year his hand-made  
products embody ‘true craftsmanship’ 115and are firmly aimed at the top niche in the market 
rivalling the legendary Steinway brand.  
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Table 1 
Larger Brass Manufacturers circa 1900 
 
Date Firm Location Employees Output 
(weekly) 
1890 F.Besson & Co. Euston Road, London 131 100 
1895 Hawkes & Son Denman St, Piccadily Circus, 
London 
100 n/a 
1890 Boosey & Co. Stanhope Place, Marble Arch, 
London 
100 n/a 
1892 J Higham Manchester 70-90 n/a 
1889 Salvation Army St Albans n/a 16 
Source: Myers (1991: p185) 
 
 
Table 2 
Boosey & Co: horn production 1920-29 
 
Model Military 
horn 
 Orchestral  
horn 
Total 
Year A41 (Eb) A40 (Eb)  
1920 12 27 39 
1921 46 25 71 
1922 39 11 50 
1923 42 19 61 
1924 0 36a 36 
1925 49 16 65 
1926 30 0 30 
1927 30 16 46 
1928 36 10 46 
1929 24 15 39 
Total 308 175 483 
Source: Boosey and Hawkes archive, 
 
a includes 6 model 42 (F & Eb) horns 
Source: Boosey & Hawkes archive, A227 
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Table 3 
Boosey & Co: horn production 1930-39 
 
Model Military 
horn 
 Orchestral/ 
Professional 
horn 
Total 
Year A41/ H&S No.2 A40/ H&S No.1  
1930 30 8 38 
1931 24 8 32 
1932 6 2 8 
1933a 11 9 20 
1934b 62 15 77 
1935 22 77c 99 
1936 31 59 90 
1937 28 35 63 
1938 13 49 62 
1939 12 27 39 
Total 239 289 528 
    
Source: Boosey and Hawkes archive, 
 
a 1933 Boosey & Co’s A40 Orchestral horn is replaced by Hawkes & Son’s Professional 
Raoux model (designated No.H1 model). 
b 1934 Boosey & Co’s A41 military horn begins to be replaced by Hawkes & Son’s Military 
and orchestral No.H2 model now designated B4047.  
c this includes 44 horns styled as  ‘German horns’. 
 
Table 4 
Boosey & Hawkes production of orchestral horns 1935-39 
Year French horn  Gerrman 
horn 
Total 
1935 59 18 77 
1936 42 17 59 
1937 32 3 35 
1938 49 0 49 
1939 27 0 27 
Total 209 38 247 
Source: Boosey and Hawkes archive,   
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Table 5 
Mergers of Brass Instrument Makers 
Date Acquirer Acquired Products Changes in activity 
1917 Boosey & Co. J R Lafleur & Son Manufacturer & 
importer 
n/a 
1925 F. Besson & Co. Quilter Not known n/a 
1930 Boosey & Co. Hawkes & Son Brass manufacturer Marble Arch plant closed 
& transferred to Edgware 
1930 Mayers & Harrison J Higham Brass Manufacturer Plant closed/ production 
ceased 
1940 F. Besson & Co. Wheatstone & Co Instrument 
manufacturer 
Manufacturing 
transferred 
1941 Boosey & Hawkes 
Ltd 
Rudall Carte & Co Flute & Brass 
manufacturer 
Plant closed 1939 & 
production transferred to 
Edgware 
1948 Boosey & Hawkes 
Ltd 
F. Besson & Co Brass manufacturer Plant closed & 
production transferred to 
Edgware 
1970 Boosey & Hawkes 
Ltd 
Salvation Army 
Brass factory 
Brass manufacturer Plant closed & 
production transferred to 
Edgware 
 
 
Table 6 
Boosey & Hawkes production of orchestral horns 1945-54 
Tear French horn  German horn Total 
1945 15 0 15 
1946 4 0 4 
1947 28 0 28 
1948 3 18 21 
1949 18 18 36 
1950 17 30 47 
1951 39 18 57 
1952 19 8 27 
1953 18 34 52 
1954 30 29 59 
Total 191 155 346 
    
Source: Boosey and Hawkes archive,   
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Figure 1 
French horn catalogue of Hawkes & Son, circa. 1930 
 
 
Source: Morley-Pegge papers, RMP 2/6/21 
 
Figure 2 British horn players of the 1920s 
 
Source: Morley-Pegge papers, RMP 2/6/21  
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Figure 3 
Boosey & Hawkes German horn circa 1935 (horn on the left) 
 
 
 
Boosey & Hawkes archive,  DSCO 3472, p95 
 
Figure 4 
Boosey & Hawkes brass instrument production during World War Two 
 
 
 
Source: Boosey & Hawkes archive  
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Figure 5 
Advertisement in Musicians Union handbook, 1936. 
 
Source: Musicians’ Union (1936) 
 
Figure 6 
1st International Brass Congress at Montreux, 1976 
Willi Watson, Richard Merewether, Herman Baumann and Robert Paxman (left to right)  
 
 
Source: Willi Watson – personal communication 
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